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Party Membership and Campaign Activity in Britain: The Impact of 
Electoral Performance 
 
This article examines the impact of electoral results on party membership and 
activity. Previous studies have focussed on the long-term effects of electoral 
success or failure, suggesting that they may produce a spiral of 
demobilisation or mobilisation. This article shows that the dramatic change of 
electoral fortunes experienced by British parties at the 1997 general election 
broke this spiral. The outcome of this election has lead to significant changes 
in the health and activity of local parties and concludes that dramatic election 
results can have significant implications for party organisation.  
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Introduction 
A substantial body of literature has demonstrated that effective constituency election 
campaigns can have significant electoral payoffs for political parties (Denver and Hands, 
1997, 1998; Denver et al, 2001; Whiteley and Seyd 1994, 2003; Pattie et al 1995).  In 
part, this has been due to greater involvement by the parties‟ central headquarters in 
planning and managing constituency campaigns (Fisher et al, 2004) but it remains clear, 
nonetheless, that parties need active members on the ground and good local organisation 
if they are to mount effective campaigns at the constituency level.  But what determines 
levels of local membership and activity?  A number of recent studies have suggested that 
these themselves may be significantly affected by previous electoral success or failure in 
the constituency concerned. 
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Fisher (2000) showed that variations in the size of constituency party membership in 
1997 could be explained in part by the socio-economic characteristics of the constituency 
and the amount of disruption caused by recent boundary revisions, but that the degree of 
electoral success previously enjoyed by the party in the constituency also had a 
significant impact.  He concluded that success can, in effect, breed success.  Parties 
perform well where they have more members and this in turn makes it more likely that 
they will retain or increase their membership and hence perform well in the future.  
Whiteley and Seyd (1998) focus on general levels of party activity, and argue that 
electoral success or failure is likely to have an impact in this area as well.  Activists‟ 
sense of individual and group efficacy will be strengthened when their party does well, 
and weakened when it does badly.  This, they suggest, may lead either to a „spiral of 
mobilisation‟ as these effects become reinforced over time or to a corresponding „spiral 
of demobilisation‟. 
 
Fisher‟s analysis concentrates mainly on long-term electoral performance.  However, 
when election results produce dramatic changes in the electoral status of constituencies, it 
seems likely that there will also be short-term effects.  The 1997 election is a case in 
point – no fewer than 184 seats changed hands, the Conservative vote declined sharply 
and the number of seats won by the Liberal Democrats more than doubled.  Such a 
marked change in party fortunes may well have an impact on both constituency party size 
and future levels of campaign activity – defeat is likely to depress membership and make 
those who remain less keen to participate actively, while winning (or coming close to it) 
may enhance both membership and activity. 
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In this article, we use data derived from postal surveys of constituency election 
agents/organisers conducted immediately after the general elections of 1992, 1997 and 2001 
to examine the impact of both short-term and long-term electoral performance on party 
membership and campaign activity.
1
 The surveys covered the three major British parties – 
the Conservatives, Labour and Liberal Democrats – on which, for the most part, we 
concentrate here, as well as the SNP in Scotland and Plaid Cymru in Wales.  Response rates 
were notably high and the resulting samples representative of all constituencies.
2
   
 
We focus on responses to two survey questions. The first asked respondents to give an 
estimate of the number of party members in their constituency; the second asked what 
proportion of the electorate was covered by an active local campaign organisation during 
the election.  Election agents are in a good position to know the size of their local party 
and comparison with figures derived from other sources suggests that the data derived 
from the surveys are reliable (Fisher, 2000).  We are thus able to analyse variations in 
constituency membership across parties and over time.  Responses to the second question 
are inevitably less precise and may be subject to wider margins of error.  Nonetheless, 
they provide a reasonable basis on which to explore variations in the extent of party 
campaign activity at local level. 
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Party membership and the extent of election organisation within constituencies 
1992-2001 
Table 1 shows the mean number of party members per constituency at the time of each of 
the three elections.  It is clear, first, that there has been a steady decline in membership of 
local Conservative associations, with average membership being more than halved 
between 1992 and 2001. Various explanations for this decline have been suggested.  
First, as Whiteley, Seyd and Richardson (1994) point out, Conservative decline has been 
an ongoing process for some time, exacerbated by the high mean age of members, 
estimated to be 62 in 1994.  Secondly, the political circumstances of the last decade are 
likely to have been important. Not only has the party been badly divided, it has also 
suffered repeated election defeats.   Having won the 1992 general election, the 
Conservatives then experienced a series of disastrous defeats - in local and European 
Parliament elections and in parliamentary by-elections.  After 1997, of course, the picture 
was even starker.  Although there was something of a „bottoming out‟ of Conservative 
fortunes at local and European levels, the party did not win a single by-election seat from 
Labour and made virtually no progress in the 2001 general election.  It would be 
surprising if this continued electoral unpopularity did not contribute to membership 
decline. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that throughout the period the Conservatives had 
a larger mean membership per constituency than any other party. 
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Table 1.  Mean number of party members per constituency, 1992-2001 
 
 1992 1997 2001 
 
Conservative 1,542 732 646 
Labour 444 592 475 
Liberal Democrats 166 162 130 
Plaid Cymru 226 230 328 
SNP 166 198 204 
 
Note: Ns are as in footnote 2 with slight variations due to missing data. 
 
For Labour, the picture has been more mixed. Mean constituency membership was higher 
in 2001 than it was in 1992 but the 2001 figure represents a significant drop from the high 
point recorded in 1997. Again this might be at least partially explained by political 
circumstances. Prior to 1997, the party and its new leader were both very popular and 
there was a widespread expectation that Labour could unseat the then unpopular 
Conservative government. The decline in membership following the 1997 election may 
partly be explained by disillusion with the government (justified or otherwise) and by the 
fact that the new members recruited in the run-up to 1997 were less committed to the 
party than those who were long-term members. Seyd and Whiteley (2002) show that 
„post-Blair‟ party members were less likely to be trade unionists, had weaker partisan 
identification and were less active and than long-standing members.  
 
Liberal Democrat membership continued to be relatively small over the period and 
declined somewhat after 1997. In some ways this is a surprise, given the party‟s success 
in that election and its improved standing not only at Westminster, but also in Scotland 
and Wales – in both cases they became part of the governing coalition following the first 
elections to the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly.  One possible explanation 
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is that members may have been uncomfortable with the apparent closeness of the party to 
Labour for much of the 1990s and this may explain why Charles Kennedy, after he 
became leader, began to articulate a desire for greater distance between his party and 
Labour (Denver, 2002).  
 
By way of contrast, both the SNP and Plaid Cymru have experienced a steady growth in 
membership. It seems likely that this is to be explained by the prominence of devolution 
on the political agenda during this period, the establishment of the Scottish Parliament 
and the Welsh Assembly and the enhanced status of both parties resulting from their 
success in elections to the respective institutions. 
 
Table 2 shows how extensively local parties were organized within their constituencies at 
each election.  It can be seen, firstly, that the extent of campaign activity declined for all 
parties between 1992 and 2001, with the biggest declines being suffered by Labour and 
the Conservatives. Disillusion may have played some part in Labour‟s sharp decline 
between 1997 and 2001, but a more likely explanation is the widely-held expectation that 
there would be another Labour landslide, since the figures for both the SNP and Plaid 
Cymru also declined, even though they had increased memberships.  Secondly, while the 
Conservatives had the most extensive organisation in 1992, Labour outperformed them in 
both 1997 (clearly) and 2001 (slightly), while in all three elections the Liberal Democrats 
lagged some way behind the Conservatives and Labour in terms of organisational reach.  
Finally, the figures suggest that the SNP has been successful at maintaining extensive 
campaign organisations within constituencies. Indeed, within Scotland (although the 
details are not shown) the SNP was second only to Labour in terms of the extent of 
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election organisation in constituencies, outperforming the Conservatives and Liberal 
Democrats in all three elections. 
 
Table 2. Mean per cent of electorate covered by active campaign organisation, 1992-
2001 
 
 1992 1997 2001 
 
Conservative 62 49 51 
Labour 59 61 52 
Liberal Democrats 34 34 30 
Plaid Cymru 36 38 32 
SNP 57 56 53 
 
Note: Ns are as in footnote 2 with slight variations due to missing data. 
 
One might expect that there would be a significant association between size of party 
membership and level of local activity and Table 3 shows that this is indeed the case for 
the major parties – the coefficients measuring the strength of the association between the 
two are all positive and statistically significant, with particularly strong associations for 
the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats.  This suggests that the general decline in party 
membership may have contributed to the decline in activity.  Nonetheless, the 
relationship between the two variables is far from perfect, so it is clear that they are 
measuring distinct features of local parties. Indeed, the figures reinforce the results of 
other analyses (Fisher et al, 2004), which show that a large membership is not a 
necessary prerequisite of intense party activity.  In what follows, therefore, we analyse 
variations in membership and activity levels separately. 
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Table 3. Correlations between size of membership and extent of local activity, 1992-
2001 
 
 1992 1997 2001 
Conservative 0.44 0.43 0.52 
Labour 0.38 0.22 0.26 
Liberal Democrats 0.58 0.73 0.65 
 
Note: All coefficients are significant at p<0.01. Ns for the respective elections are 242, 404 and 
346 for the Conservatives, 338, 440 and 421 for Labour, 376, 396 and 415 for the Liberal 
Democrats. 
 
 
Variations in party membership and activity 
While these descriptive data give an overall picture of membership and levels of activity, 
there are, of course, substantial variations across constituencies. In 2001, for example, 
reported Conservative membership varied from 10 to 3,900, Labour membership from 30 
to 5,000 and Liberal Democrat membership from 3 to 800.  For all three parties, the 
proportion of the electorate covered by an active campaign organisation ranged from 0 to 
100.  In the remainder of this article, we explore possible reasons for these variations, 
focusing upon the three major British parties. As we have seen, in his earlier article 
examining levels of party membership in 1997, Fisher (2000) showed that a combination 
of structural, socio-economic and political factors helped to explain variations in the size 
of constituency parties and associations. For both the Conservatives and Labour, changes 
resulting from the review of the boundaries of parliamentary constituencies prior to the 
1997 election tended to depress membership and, for all parties, the social characteristics 
of constituencies were significant – in particular, more middle-class constituencies had 
larger local memberships.   It was also clear, however, that larger party memberships 
were associated with long-term electoral success.   
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In addition, Whiteley and Seyd (1998) argue that electoral success or failure (at the 
national level) can affect levels of individual activity.  As previously noted, they suggest 
that a „spiral of mobilisation‟ may occur „in which electoral success stimulates campaign 
activity, which in turn produces further electoral success‟ (p. 135).  On the other hand, a 
„spiral of demobilization‟ may result from electoral failure as party members become 
demoralised by defeat. First, defeat will lead to a fall in group efficacy – if one‟s party 
fails to be elected, it will be unable to implement a policy programme of which members 
approve. Secondly, personal efficacy will also decline. Those members hoping to pursue 
a political career will be less likely to be able to do so if their party is out of office. 
Whiteley and Seyd show that, overall, participation incentives declined significantly for 
Labour members following the 1992 election defeat – the party‟s fourth in a row.   
 
Whiteley and Seyd note, however, that there may also be some contrary effects – in some 
cases defeat may lead to an increase in activity and victory may depress it.   For example, 
they show that although the 1992 election result had favoured the Conservatives, the 
strength of partisanship subsequently declined more among Conservative members than 
among Labour members. This may be because members respond to defeat by „rallying 
round‟ the party.  Moreover, members who have fought hard campaigns to win marginal 
seats may suffer from campaign „burn out‟ and subsequently be less active. 
 
This earlier work was based on research carried out before the 1997 election.  Given the 
very substantial changes in the fortunes of the parties that occurred in 1997, however, it is 
clearly appropriate to re-consider the impact of electoral outcomes on party membership 
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and activity.  It is likely, of course, that socio-economic factors will continue to have 
significant effects on membership and activity levels and so we begin our analysis with 
these, using in this case data from the 2001 census. 
 
Socio-economic characteristics of constituencies, size of party membership and 
extent of campaign activity 
Fisher‟s earlier analysis of membership levels in 1997 showed that different social 
characteristics were significant for each party. At the bivariate level, Conservative 
membership was greater in constituencies which were more middle class and more rural 
and which had more owner-occupiers, fewer young people and fewer members of ethnic 
minorities.  The socio-economic correlates of Liberal Democrat membership were similar 
to those for the Conservatives, but larger Labour memberships were found where there 
were more young people and non-whites, and in more urban areas. The evidence with 
regard to class and Labour membership was mixed: relationships with traditional 
measures of occupational class were not statistically significant but membership was 
greater where car ownership and the proportion of owner-occupiers were lower.  
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Table 4.  Correlations between party membership, campaign activity and the socio-
economic characteristics of constituencies, 2001 
 
  Membership   Campaign Activity 
 Con Lab LDem Con Lab  LDem 
 
% Aged 18-24 -0.236 0.259 - -0.145 0.174 - 
% Households with Car 0.558 -0.277 0.367 0.465 -0.526 0.257 
% Owner Occupier 0.398 -0.279 0.217 0.406 -0.568 0.173 
%Council/HA -0.528 0.184 -0.369 -0.514 0.374 -0.246 
% Private rent 0.162 0.321 0.175 0.143 0.557 - 
% Prof. and Managerial 0.580 0.196 0.382 0.474 0.134 0.234 
% Manual -0.446 -0.227 -0.274 -0.400 - -0.167 
% Agriculture 0.285 -0.271 0.290 0.143 -0.256 0.200 
Persons Per hectare -0.276 0.375 -0.153 -0.177 0.130 -0.163 
% Degree 0.428 0.328 0.300 0.338 - 0.165 
% No qualifications -0.613 -0.135 -0.469 -0.521 0.194 -0.296 
% Non-white -0.171 0.440 -0.153 - 0.121 -0.176 
 
N 346 421 415 375 443 432 
 
Note: All correlations are significant at the .05 level or better.  Non-significant coefficients are 
not shown. 
 
Results of a similar bivariate analysis of membership and also of the extent of campaign 
activity in 2001 are shown in Table 4. In addition to the variables used in Fisher‟s 
analysis, we also include measures of educational attainment. With respect to 
membership, the patterns found in the earlier study are largely repeated, although the 
relationships between Labour membership and the class variables are now significant 
(albeit not very strong). The new educational variables show that, for all parties, 
membership is higher where there is a larger proportion of graduates and lower where 
there are more people without formal qualifications.  As far as activity is concerned, the 
patterns of relationships are much as expected.  There is greater Conservative activity in 
more middle-class and more rural seats; Labour activity is generally lower in more 
affluent areas (although it is positively correlated with percentage professional and 
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managerial) and greater in more urban areas.  The pattern for the Liberal Democrats is a 
paler reflection of that for the Conservatives. 
 
The impact of election results in the short term 
Election results can have both long-term and short-term impacts. As we have seen, 
previous research has shown that established electoral success boosts party membership. 
It is not just winning in the most recent election which counts, but success in previous 
elections and improved performance over time. However, a general election result such 
as that in 1997 is likely to have had a significant short-term impact: a record number of 
seats changed hands, Labour made a large number of gains – including many that were 
unexpected - and the Liberal Democrats gained significant ground while the 
Conservatives, of course, fared very badly. The effect was an increase in the number of 
seats in which there would be a significant contest in the subsequent election, with 
Labour and the Liberal Democrats trying to hold on to their gains and the Conservatives 
trying to recover at least some ground. As Denver et al (2002) show, this new electoral 
environment was confirmed by the increased number of seats targeted by the parties at 
the 2001 election.  
 
The first hypothesis we wish to test is that marginality provides a stimulus for increased 
membership and activity – parties have a greater incentive to recruit in more marginal 
seats and potential members have more incentive to become involved in closer contests.  
Given that between 1997 and 2001 the average constituency membership of the three 
main parties fell, we might expect that membership retention would be greater in more 
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marginal seats - marginality may be expected not only to boost membership but also to 
arrest its decline. Even more obviously, it is to be expected that greater campaign efforts 
will be made in more marginal seats.   
 
As a first step in testing the hypothesis, we examine the relationships between 
membership and activity levels in 2001 and the percentage majority of the first over 
second party in 1997, while controlling respectively for membership and activity levels in 
1997. This means that, in effect, we are measuring the extent to which changes in 
membership and activity between the two elections are associated with marginality in 
1997.  The analysis is confined to constituencies in which the relevant party was placed 
either first or second in 1997 (since it is in these cases that marginality is likely to have an 
impact) and the relevant partial correlation coefficients are shown in Table 5. 
 
Table 5. Partial correlations: membership and activity levels 2001 and percentage 
majority in 1997 (controlling for membership and activity in 1997) 
 
 Membership Campaign Activity 
Conservative -0.16 -0.35 
Labour 0.06 0.02 
Liberal Democrat -0.41 0.03 
 
Note:  Significant coefficients at p<0.05 or better are printed in bold.  Ns for membership are Con 
205, Lab 232, Lib Dem 55.  Ns for activity are Con 240, Lab 250, Lib Dem 61. 
 
The evidence suggests that for both the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats 
membership fell less between 1997 and 2001 in seats which had smaller majorities in 
1997.  The relationship is stronger in the case of the Liberal Democrats, although the 
number of cases is significantly smaller than for the other two parties. For Labour, 
however, the size of the majority in 1997 does not appear to have had an impact on 
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membership levels in 2001.  Somewhat surprisingly, the size of the 1997 majority does 
not appear to have affected the extent of Labour or Liberal Democrat campaign activity 
in 2001, having taken account of activity in 1997, but the expected relationship is found 
in the case of the Conservatives – the smaller the percentage majority, the more extensive 
the campaign in 2001. 
 
A second hypothesis relating to the short-term impact of the 1997 election is that whether 
a party wins in a constituency affects its subsequent membership and activity. We suggest 
that there is a hierarchy of election outcomes in terms of the likely effects on party 
morale. From a party‟s point of view there are four possible outcomes in a constituency 
which (in order of presumed effect on morale) are: the seat is gained, the seat is retained, 
the seat is lost and the seat remains in the hands of another party.  For party morale, 
victory is better than defeat, but a new victory is also better than simply holding on. 
Similarly, losing a seat but remaining in contention for its re-capture, is better than 
repeatedly failing to win a seat. In the case of the 1997 election, the Conservatives gained 
no seats and so there are only three possible outcomes for them: the seat is held, lost or 
remains in other hands. Equally, Labour lost no seats, so it also has only three possible 
outcomes: the seat is gained, held or remains in other hands. In the case of the Liberal 
Democrats, we simply divide seats into victories or defeats, as there are too few cases to 
disaggregate gains, holds and losses.  
 
In order to test the hypotheses that constituency outcomes affect membership and 
activity, we use regression models incorporating dummy variables to indicate the 
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different election outcomes for each party (with „seat held by other party‟ as the reference 
category for Labour and the Conservatives, and „seat lost‟ as the reference for the Liberal 
Democrats).  In addition, we include levels of membership and activity in 1997 as control 
variables (which effectively controls for the effects of social characteristics).  It should be 
noted that these models are fairly stiff tests of the impact of the election outcome 
variables since the previous membership and activity level variables are likely to account 
for much of the variance in membership and activity in 2001. 
 
 
Table 6.  The impact of 1997 election outcomes on party membership and activity 2001 
 
  Membership   Activity 
 Con Lab LDem Con Lab LDem 
1997 membership 0.642 0.792 0.836 - - - 
1997 activity - - - 0.263 0.204 0.213 
Lab Gain 1997 - 0.089 - - 0.365 - 
LD Win 1997 - - 0.094 - - 0.253 
Con/Lab Held 1997 0.277 0.075 - 0.426 0.380 - 
Con Loss 1997  0.133 - - 0.266 - - 
 
Adj. r2 0.694 0.681 0.792 0.344 0.264 0.459 
 
 
N 237 306 283 276 327 304 
 
Note: All coefficients are standardized beta weights.  All coefficients are significant, p<0.05 or 
better. 
 
Table 6 shows that the outcomes of the 1997 election did indeed have a significant impact 
upon membership and activity. For all three parties, greater electoral success boosts 
membership: Conservative holds, Labour gains and Liberal Democrat wins in 1997 are 
all associated with higher levels of membership in 2001. It is also true that Conservative 
defeats and Labour holds are associated with higher memberships (relative to seats 
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remaining in other hands) but the beta weights show that the impact on membership is 
greater for Conservative holds and for Labour gains. 
 
The pattern as far as the extent of activity in 2001 is concerned is very similar.  For the 
Conservatives, 2001 activity was significantly greater both in seats that were held and 
those that were lost in 1997 than in seats that were retained by another party. Labour 
activity was higher in seats gained and seats held and for the Liberal Democrats local 
activity was clearly higher in relative terms in seats won in 1997. 
 
Table 7.   The impact of 1997 marginality and electoral outcomes on party membership 
and campaign activity 2001 
 
  Membership   Activity 
 Con Lab LD Con Lab LD 
1997 membership 0.745 0.804 0.600 - - - 
1997 activity - - - 0.213 0.198  0.428 
Lab Gain 1997 - 0.097 - - 0.337 - 
LD Win 1997 - - 0.118 - - 0.372 
Con/Lab Held 1997 0.124 0.032 - 0.284 0.448 - 
Con Loss 1997  0.038 - - 0.109 - - 
1997 majority -0.055 0.061 -0.286 -0.232 -0.170 0.056 
 
Adj. r2 0.727 0.682 0.709 0.333 0.138 0.376 
 
N 208 235 58 243 253 64 
 
Note : All coefficients are standardized beta weights; statistically significant coefficients (p< 0.05 
or better) are printed in bold. 
 
 
Finally in this section, majority in 1997 is added to the regression models and the results 
are shown in Table 7. These confirm the impact of the optimal electoral outcome for 
Labour - membership held up best in seats that had been gained in 1997 – but the 
coefficient for Conservative holds just fails to achieve statistical significance. In neither 
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case is 1997 majority significant once electoral outcomes are taken into account. By 
contrast, the size of majority in 1997 remains a significant predictor of Liberal Democrat 
membership, being more important than winning the seat in 1997. 
 
In respect of campaign activity, however, size of majority has a significant impact in the 
expected direction for both the Conservatives and Labour. In addition, there were greater 
levels of activity by the Conservatives in seats that they held in 1997 as compared with 
those that they lost or those retained by another party (the reference category). For 
Labour both seats held and seats gained had greater activity in 2001 than others.  Again 
the picture is different for the Liberal Democrats.  The size of majority is not significant 
but levels of activity were higher in seats won in 1997 than in those that were not won. 
 
Taking Tables 6 and 7 together, there is some evidence that the 1997 election results had 
a demobilizing effect on the Conservatives. The results in Table 6 suggest that 
membership fell more in seats that were lost than in seats held, although neither figure is 
significant when 1997 majority is introduced.  Campaign activity was greater in more 
marginal seats and in both holds and losses, as compared to the reference category, but 
the coefficients indicate that the strongest predictor of the level of campaign activity in 
2001 was holding the seat in 1997.  
 
For Labour and the Liberal Democrats we would expect to see evidence of „mobilisation‟ 
and Labour membership did hold up best in seats gained in 1997. Campaign activity was 
also greater in these seats than in the reference category, while holding the seat in 1997 
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and the size of majority are also significant predictors of activity level. In the case of the 
Liberal Democrats, membership is related to the size of majority in 1997, but whether a 
seat was won or lost apparently makes no difference.  On the other hand, winning in 1997 
did make a significant difference to the level of activity in 2001.  Overall, then, the 1997 
election results clearly affected subsequent membership and activity, with optimal results, 
for the most part, generating higher levels than non-optimal ones.  On the other hand, 
there is no evidence to support the suggestion of campaign „burn out‟: in seats gained by 
Labour, held by the Conservatives and won by the Liberal Democrats the coefficients for 
campaign activity in 2001 are positive and significant. Moreover, the coefficients for 
1997 majority – where they are significant – indicate that activity and membership were 
greater in more marginal seats. 
 
The impact of long-term electoral performance 
The evidence thus far appears to suggest that the results of the 1997 election had a 
significant impact on both party membership and local party activity. While levels of 
both generally fell for all three parties, the declines were usually greater where there was 
least electoral success and smaller where the 1997 electoral outcome was more 
favourable. In the short-term, then, the outcome of the 1997 election had clear effects on 
local parties. However, in his analysis of party membership in 1997 Fisher (2000:140) 
argues that we should consider the impact of election outcomes in the longer term, since 
institutional inertia may mean that change is more gradual. To explore this question, what 
is required is a measure of electoral success in the longer-term.  For this purpose, Fisher 
used what he called an „Index of Hope‟, based upon a party‟s position in elections from 
 19 
 
1979 onwards, and found that it was a significant predictor of party membership. In this 
analysis, therefore, in order to test the impact of long-term electoral performance we 
include this Index of Hope, along with measures of success in 1997, in appropriate 
regression models.  
 
The index is calculated for each party in each constituency and covers elections from 
1979 to 1992; a larger score is assigned for coming first than for being second (others 
scoring zero) and the scores diminish as elections go back in time. Thus, a winning party 
in 1992 scores 5 and a second party 3; in 1987 a winning party scores 4 and a second 
party 2; and so on.
3
   The index captures relative party success in the past, the assumption 
being that previous success will have affected membership and activity and, due to 
inertia, will continue to have an effect, although a gradually diminishing one, over time.  
The fact that there was a change in constituency boundaries between 1979 and 1983 
causes a slight problem, however.  To cope with this, the constituencies used for the 1979 
scores were those that were the largest single component of the new seats created for the 
1983 election and after.  This is not wholly satisfactory but it seems likely that, while 
boundaries may change, local party organization will change less rapidly and thus the 
political history of an area will continue to have some impact on parties, even if the actual 
constituency boundary has changed.  
 
An initial bivariate correlation analysis shows that the Index of Hope is strongly 
associated with levels of membership and activity in 2001.  For membership, the relevant 
coefficients are 0.60 for the Conservatives, 0.27 for Labour and 0.62 for the Liberal 
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Democrats.  The respective coefficients for activity are 0.59, 0.38 and 0.51.  All 
coefficients are statistically significant.
4
 
 
Turning now to multivariate analysis, Table 8 reports the results of regressions with 
membership and campaign activity in 2001 as dependent variables.  Since long-term success 
or failure would, presumably, have affected membership and campaign activity in 1997 we 
do not include these as controls here but rather use the socio-economic characteristics of 
constituencies previously listed in Table 4 (although the details are not shown in Table 8).  
As before, electoral success in 1997 is indicated both by dummy variables showing whether 
the seat was won, lost or held and 1997 majority, while the Index of Hope is used to 
measure long-term success. 
 
Table 8.  Short- and long-term electoral impacts on membership and campaign activity 
2001 
 
  Membership   Activity 
 Con Lab LDem Con Lab LDem 
 
Lab Gain 1997 - 0.204 - - 0.430 - 
LD Win 1997 - - 0.435 - - 0.378 
Con/Lab Held 1997 0.341 0.225 - 0.047 0.493 - 
Con Loss 1997 0.132 - - -0.042 - - 
1997 majority 0.095 0.219 -0.485 -0.091 -0.107 -0.300 
Index of Hope 0.102 0.108 -0.143 0.216 -0.040 0.132 
 
Adj. r2 0.543 0.286 0.500 0.373 0.110 0.245 
 
N 301 333 93 328 346 98 
 
Note : All coefficients are standardized beta weights; statistically significant coefficients (p, 0.05 
or better) are printed in bold.  Coefficients for socio-economic variables are not shown. 
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As far as membership is concerned, the data confirm the importance of short-term success 
for all three parties. Conservative membership held up best in seats held in 1997, Labour 
membership in seats gained and Liberal Democrat membership in seats won.  In addition, 
1997 majority affected Liberal Democrat membership in the expected direction although 
Labour membership was smaller in more marginal seats.  Perhaps the most striking aspect of 
these results, however, is that, contrary to Fisher‟s results for membership in 1997; long-
term success (or lack of it) as measured by the Index of Hope has no significant impact on 
the size of party membership in 2001. 
 
Outcomes in 1997 also influenced the extent of Labour and Liberal Democrat campaign 
activity in 2001, but 1997 majority had no significant impact.  As with membership, 
however, the Index of Hope is not significant for any of the parties, suggesting that longer-
term electoral performance in a constituency had no effect on the level of campaign activity 
in 2001. 
 
These results for 2001, as we have indicated, run counter to those reported by Fisher for 
party membership in 1997.  How is this to be explained?  We suggest that the answer lies in 
the nature of the 1997 general election.  The previous four elections from 1979 to 1992 had 
been won by the Conservatives and during that period the electoral status of constituencies 
was relatively stable.  A local party‟s long-term performance was a very good guide to its 
prospects in any forthcoming election.  In 1997, however, things were turned upside down.  
The electoral status of many constituencies was dramatically changed.  The effects of that 
change on local parties were powerful – as we have seen – and effectively over-rode any 
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long-term effects.  In a sense a party‟s performance between 1979 and 1992 now belonged 
to a different era and became irrelevant to success at retaining members or levels of 
campaign activity.   
 
Conclusion 
Earlier work on the effects of electoral performance on party membership and activity has 
largely focussed on long-term electoral success or failure.  Thus, Fisher‟s earlier work 
was consistent with the view put forward by Whiteley and Seyd (1998) that a „spiral of 
demobilisation‟ may arise from electoral failure and a „spiral of mobilisation‟ from 
success.  
 
What we have shown here is that any such spiral can be broken by a single election in which 
there is a sharp reversal of previous results.  The performance of parties in constituencies 
during the years of Conservative dominance between 1979 and 1992 appears to have had no 
impact on their membership and activity in 2001.  In contrast, the constituency outcomes of 
the 1997 election generally had clear and significant short-term effects.  If Whiteley and 
Seyd are correct, then, the 1997 election may have started a new spiral.  We may expect the 
changes to constituency status consequent upon the 1997 election to have a long-term 
impact on the health and activity of local parties – at least until another election sees a sharp 
reversal of the parties‟ fortunes. 
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Notes 
 
1. The surveys referred to in the paper were conducted in connection with ESRC-supported 
studies of constituency campaigning - grant reference numbers Y304 25 3004 (1992), 
R000222027 (1997) and R000239396 (2001). 
 
2. The number of survey respondents from each party in each of the elections was as 
follows: 
 1992 1997 2001 
 
Conservative 265 434 375 
Labour 356 455 443 
Liberal Democrats 383 411 432 
Plaid Cymru 21 24 27 
SNP 26 44 52 
 
The overall response rates were 53.0%, 68.1% and 65.5% respectively.  For evidence of 
the representativeness of responding constituencies see Denver et al (2004, p. 305). 
 
3. A party winning a constituency scores 5 for 1992, 4 for 1987, 3 for 1983 and 2 for 1979.  
Respective scores for a party in second place are 3, 2, 1 and 0.5.  A party outside the top 
two places scores zero. 
 
4. The numbers of cases on which these calculations are based are, for membership: 
Conservative 347, Labour 421, Liberal Democrat 415 and for activity: Conservative 375, 
Labour 443, Liberal Democrat 508. 
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